Interactive Information Design

Frédéric Koessler (1, 2) , Marie Laclau (1, 2) , Tristan Tomala (3, 4)

1 PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques
2 PSE - Paris School of Economics
3 GREGH - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC
4 HEC Paris - Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales

We study the interaction between multiple information designers who try to influence the behavior of a set of agents. When each designer can choose information policies from a compact set of statistical experiments with countable support, such games always admit subgame perfect equilibria. When designers produce public information, every equilibrium of the simple game in which the set of messages coincides with the set of states is robust in the sense that it is an equilibrium with larger and possibly infinite and uncountable message sets. The converse is true for a class of Markovian equilibria only. When designers produce information for their own corporation of agents, robust pure strategy equilibria exist and are characterized via an auxiliary normal form game in which the set of strategies of each designer is the set of outcomes induced by Bayes correlated equilibria in her corporation.

Mots clés: Statistical experiments; Splitting games; Sharing rules; Information design; Bayesian persuasion

Domaines: Economies et finances

Frédéric Koessler, Marie Laclau, Tristan Tomala. Interactive Information Design. Mathematics of Operations Research, 2022, 47 (1), pp.153-175. ⟨halshs-01791918v2⟩