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Pré-Publication, Document De Travail Année : 2019

A solution to the two-person implementation problem

Résumé

We propose a solution to the classical problem of Hurwicz and Schmeidler [1978] and Maskin [1999] according to which, in two-person societies, no Pareto efficient rule is Nash-implementable. To this end, we consider implementation through mechanisms that are deterministic-in-equilibrium while lotteries are allowed off-equilibrium. For strict preferences over alternatives and under a very weak condition for extending preferences over lotteries, we build simple veto mechanisms that Nash implement a class of Pareto efficient social choice rules called Pareto-and-veto rules. Moreover, under mild richness conditions on the domain of preferences over lotteries, any Pareto efficient Nashimplementable rule is a Pareto-and-veto rule and hence is implementable through one of our simple veto mechanisms.
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Dates et versions

halshs-02173504 , version 1 (04-07-2019)
halshs-02173504 , version 2 (08-11-2019)
halshs-02173504 , version 3 (05-05-2020)

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  • HAL Id : halshs-02173504 , version 2

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Jean-François Laslier, Matias Nunez, M Remzi Sanver. A solution to the two-person implementation problem. 2019. ⟨halshs-02173504v2⟩
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