Profit Shifting and Equilibrium Principles of International Taxation

Manon François (1, 2)

1 PSE - Paris School of Economics
2 PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques

We study the choice between source-based and destination-based corporate taxes in a twocountry model, allowing multinational firms to use transfer pricing to allocate profits across tax jurisdictions. We show that source-based taxation is a Nash equilibrium for tax revenue maximizing jurisdictions if domestic and/or foreign firms generate large revenues. We also show that destination-based taxes are a Nash equilibrium when firms generate low revenues, which implies the presence of multiple equilibria. Both the source and the destination principle coexist in equilibrium when domestic and foreign corporate revenues are average. However, the source principle always Pareto-dominates the destination principle.

Mots clés: Tax competition; Multinational firms; Corporate taxes; Transfer pricing

Domaines: Economies et finances

Manon François. Profit Shifting and Equilibrium Principles of International Taxation. 2021. ⟨halshs-03265056v1⟩