Long Information Design

Frédéric Koessler (1, 2) , Marie Laclau (1, 2) , Jérôme Renault (3) , Tristan Tomala (4, 5)

1 PSE - Paris School of Economics
2 PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques
3 TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics
4 GREGH - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC
5 HEC Paris - Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales

We analyze strictly competitive information design games between two designers and an agent. Before the agent takes a decision, designers disclose public information at multiple stages about persistent state parameters. We consider environments with arbitrary constraints on feasible in- formation disclosure policies. Our main results characterize equilibrium payoffs and strategies for various timings of the game: simultaneous or alternating disclosures, with or without deadline. With- out constraints on policies, information is disclosed in a single stage, but there may be no bound on the number stages used to disclose information when policies are constrained. As an application, we study competition in product demonstration and show that more information is revealed when there is a deadline. The format that provides the buyer with the most information is the sequential game with deadline in which the ex-ante strongest seller is the last mover.

Mots clés: Bayesian persuasion; concavification; convexification; information design; Mertens Zamir solution; product demonstration; splitting games; statistical experiments; stochastic games

Domaines: Economies et finances

Frédéric Koessler, Marie Laclau, Jérôme Renault, Tristan Tomala. Long Information Design. 2019. ⟨halshs-02400053v1⟩