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Robust equilibrium outcomes in sequential games under almost common certainty of payoffs

Abstract : We analyze the robustness of equilibria in sequential games when there is almost common certainty of payoffs. We show that a generic extensive-form game may have no robust equilibrium behavior, but has at least one robust equilibrium outcome, which is induced by a proper equilibrium in its normal-form representation. Therefore, backward induction leads to a unique robust outcome in a generic perfect-information game. We also discuss close relation between robustness to incomplete information and strategic stability. Finally, we present the implications of our results for the robustness of subgame-perfect implementation.
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Submitted on : Friday, May 20, 2022 - 11:21:48 AM
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Satoru Takahashi, Olivier Tercieux. Robust equilibrium outcomes in sequential games under almost common certainty of payoffs. Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, 2020, 188, ⟨10.1016/j.jet.2020.105068⟩. ⟨halshs-02875199⟩

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